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Introduction
It is a widely held policy belief that improving the schooling of children from low-income families is an essential step toward severing intergenerational links between poverty and dependence on public assistance (Pepper 2000; Solon 1992) . A corollary is that social programs aimed at improving the well-being of lowincome families should be evaluated in large part according to their educational effects. This paper evaluates the impact of the welfare reforms of the 1990s-arguably, the most dramatic reforms in the history of the U.S. welfare system-on the educational attainment of children from low-income families, a longterm outcome that has been omitted from most evaluations.
The dramatic changes to the U.S. welfare system embodied in the state welfare waivers of the early 1990s and in the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-193) were aimed at promoting adult employment and reducing long-term dependence on public assistance. While the details varied across states, common policy innovations included time limits, job subsidies, work requirements, and increased funding for child support. Most of the existing scholarly work in the welfare reform literature has focused on adults and found substantial increases in the labor force participation of single mothers and reductions in public assistance case loads (Blank 2002; Moffitt 2003; Grogger and Karoly 2005) . These observed changes in maternal behavior, along with potential changes in family structure, parenting quality, and self-motivation, can lead to considerable changes in the educational investments for and schooling outcomes of children in low-income families.
This paper is the first to measure the impact of welfare reform on the educational attainment of children in low-income families using large, nationally representative samples. Our outcome measures span the period from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s and are drawn from two sources. Our primary attainment measures are constructed using the Common Core of Data (CCD), an administrative census of school district records from the Department of Education (National Center for Education Statistics 1991 Statistics -2003 . In a robustness analysis, we confirm the main findings using self-reported enrollment rates for children ages 13-18 in the Current Population Survey (CPS).
We estimate the net effect of welfare reform in a generalized difference-indifferences framework in which trends in the educational attainment of children in higher income households are used to impute counterfactual trends for what would have happened to youths in low-income households absent welfare reform. In our initial analysis, we associate state welfare reforms with improved educational outcomes for low-income children. We then extend the analysis to consider dynamic effects and to test for preexisting trends. We find statistically indistinguishable time trends for low-income and higher income children before welfare reform but significant and growing relative gains for low-income children after welfare reform. This finding is robust to alternative definitions of low-and higher income groups and to controlling for the adoption of school accountability programs-the most important contemporaneous policy change likely affecting low-income students differentially.
This paper contributes to the new literature on the educational effects of welfare reform on several fronts. First, we provide the first evidence of beneficial effects for both male and female adolescents. Evaluations of the welfare reform experiments find evidence of improvements in both self-reported and teacherreported academic achievement measures and test scores for young children randomized into reform groups (Duncan and Chase-Lansdale 2001; Zaslow et al. 2002; Morris, Duncan, and Clark-Kauffman 2005) . 1 Similarly, Miller and Zhang (2009) use data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress to find substantial relative gains in mathematics test scores for low-income fourth-grade students in the years after national welfare reform. Although these childhood gains are important, a natural concern is that they may erode with time.
2 Indeed, some experimental studies find increases in self-reported dropout, expulsion, and suspension rates for adolescents in the welfare reform treatment group (Gennetian et al. 2004 ). This finding of adverse effects of welfare interventions, however, is not consistent with the finding of eighth-grade test score gains in Miller and Zhang (2009) and may be due to the limited schooling outcome measures or other drawbacks of the experimental studies that especially apply to older children. This paper uses national data on objective schooling measures for adolescents to address the question of persistence.
In contrast to the experimental literature, a major contribution of this study is the use of large national samples of educational attainment data spanning the period from 1991 to 2005. We estimate the effects of the actual statewide and national welfare reforms that were implemented. In the experimental studies, the geographic variation is limited, and the policies under study tend to employ weaker work requirements than the statewide and national reforms; the experiments are also likely to miss any general equilibrium effects from widespread reforms (Grogger and Karoly 2005) . In addition, the experimental setup, in which welfare recipients are randomized into treatment and control groups, prevents researchers from assessing entry effects if welfare reform causes some adults to voluntarily avoid or curtail their participation. This is particularly problematic for studies focused on adolescents, who are themselves potential welfare recipients.
3 By limiting the sample to current welfare participants, experimental approaches miss a key channel for the impact of reforms. The low-income group in this paper is defined to include former, current, and potential welfare recipients and to facilitate the capturing of the important entry and exit effects.
This research also advances the literature using observational data and studying national reform by combining an analysis of both administrative and survey data on large, national samples for an extended period. Previous studies of welfare reform and adolescents have largely relied on self-reported educational outcomes from surveys. Kaestner, Korenman, and O'Neill (2003) use National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth from the 1979 and 1997 entry cohorts to track changes in relative outcomes for teenage girls from more and less advantaged backgrounds over a period that includes welfare reform. They present evidence of relative improvements for disadvantaged girls, which contrasts with the lack of significant associations found by Hao and Cherlin (2004) , who compare adjacent cohorts within the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 1997 entry cohort. The lack of positive effects noted by Hao and Cherlin may be the result of their limited sample sizes and the short-term nature of their estimates, which were computed immediately after welfare reforms. 4 Offner (2005) and Dave, Reichman, and Corman (2009) provide the studies closest to our analysis of survey data from the October CPS (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1990 -2005 presented in Section 5. Both focus on teenage girls. Offner uses March CPS data for more than 20,000 individuals to associate, in a difference-in-differences framework, welfare reform with lower dropout rates and out-of-wedlock fertility rates for teenage girls from disadvantaged backgrounds. The results are consistent across each of the comparison groups (based on income, gender, and motherhood). Although the focus of Dave, Reichman, and Corman (2009) is women 21-49 years of age, that paper also contains an analysis of teenage girls performed using October CPS data. The result is complementary: unmarried teenage girls in low-education (without adults who are college graduates), non-two-parent households exhibit a decline in high school dropout rates relative to a control group of unmarried 15-20-year-old males in similar households. This paper is the first to use administrative data on schooling outcomes to validate the estimates from self-reported survey data. It is also the only paper in the literature to go beyond difference-in-differences models comparing periods before and after welfare reform to exploit the available panel data to estimate dynamic effects of welfare reform. This is accomplished by expanding the empirical model to include terms for several years before and after the policy change. As in Miller and Zhang (2009) , the impact of welfare reform is not immediately expressed in educational outcomes but increases in size during the first decade after reforms. This may occur because of accumulating gains through the educational production process or because of the importance of early childhood exposure. The dynamic framework also allows us to test the validity of the difference-in-differences framework by estimating changes in relative outcomes preceding welfare reform. The lack of preexisting trends provides support for assigning a causal interpretation to the benefits associated with welfare reform in observational studies.
Finally, to our knowledge, this is the only paper to estimate educational benefits from welfare reform to adolescent males. As described in Section 2, the dynamic effects of welfare reform can occur through direct incentive effects as well as indirect mechanisms that operate through changes in the home environment and accumulate over time. The direct incentive effect should be stronger for young women, who can potentially become single mothers and who face a much greater risk of ever receiving welfare benefits. However, the incentive effects can still affect the educational choices of young men, since these men are likely both the sexual partners of the women being affected by welfare reform and the fathers of their children. The indirect effects that occur through changes in maternal behavior and the home environment should have more similar effects on males and females. Our finding of educational benefits for teenagers of both sexes is consistent with the finding (in Miller and Zhang [2009] as well as in experimental studies of younger children) of test score gains for younger children of both sexes and provides evidence of lasting effects from changes in the home environment. The fact that gains increase over time is also consistent with the evidence for younger children and with the primary mechanism for the effect being changes in the home environment, the benefits of which increase with more years of exposure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on welfare reform and educational attainment, and Section 3 describes the attainment data. Sections 4 and 5 discuss results, and Section 6 concludes.
Welfare Reform and Schooling Background
In standard human capital models (Becker 1964; Ben-Porath 1967) , utilitymaximizing individuals invest in schooling up to the point at which the benefit from an additional year of schooling (including higher discounted future earnings, better health, and higher nonpecuniary values) is equal to the cost (for example, forgone earnings, direct monetary costs, and disutility from studying). Optimal schooling varies across individuals as a result of differences in innate ability, family and school inputs, and socioeconomic environment. Welfare reform changed maternal behavior and family environment as well as the future economic rewards from working for children in low-income households. These indirect (through home environment) and direct (through work incentives) channels may independently or collectively affect the expected costs and benefits of school investment, thereby shifting the educational outcomes of low-income individuals.
Increased maternal employment has a theoretically ambiguous effect on the level of family inputs devoted to children's education. On the one hand, maternal employment can hinder school performance by reducing the time available for home production, such as supervising and disciplining children, reading to them, and assisting with homework.
5 Slower learning progress accumulated over time can lead to large skill gaps by adolescence and early-dropout decisions. 6 Lagging behind peers in school performance can also lead to greater disutility from schooling and earlier exit from school. On the other hand, working mothers may feel more secure and confident, resulting in greater productivity at home. They may also provide their children with improved stability and daily routine, serve as better role models for them, and instill in them a greater desire for financial independence and academic achievement. Working mothers may also acquire useful human capital on the job, such as learning about child rearing from coworkers.
7 Increased family income may also boost children's school performance through improved nutrition and reading materials at home, although the earned income gains were largely offset by reduced welfare benefits.
8 Improved school performance can then lead to increased schooling quantity.
Furthermore, welfare reform may have increased the financial returns to schooling for low-income individuals to the extent that it made long-term dependence on public assistance a less attractive or viable alternative to paid employment.
9 Low-income adolescents may remain in school longer because of this direct incentive. Welfare reform, through its new eligibility requirements, may also provide parents with financial incentives to keep their children in school or stay in school themselves if they are minors and do not have a high school diploma or a general educational development certificate. These different pathways lead to opposing effects, and the net effect of welfare reform on schooling is inherently an empirical question.
We use a difference-in-differences framework to estimate the net effect of welfare reform on the educational attainment of low-income children:
where s indexes state, t indexes year, and i indexes the unit of observation. The 6 In Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967) , individuals benefit more from schooling when they are more productive in translating time in school into additional units of human capital, and hence they stay in school longer. There is substantial evidence that students who do better in school, through either grades or scores on standardized achievement tests, tend to go further in school. See, for example, Rivkin (1995) and Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996) . 7 There is experimental evidence that the children of women assigned to welfare policies that promote adult education and training show improved school readiness and fewer academic problems (Magnusen and McGroder 2002) . However, our study measures the effects of the national and statewide reforms, which focus more on employment. Indeed, Jacobs and Winslow (2004) detail how the work-first approach of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families may have reduced higher education enrollment among single mothers. 8 Prior studies of maternal employment and child human capital produce mixed evidence. Negative effects are concentrated among children in more affluent, two-parent families with more educated mothers (Ruhm 2004; Baum 2003) . For financial resources, Blau (1999) finds only trivial direct effects of family income on child development. Waldfogel (2007) reports no positive association between U.S. welfare reform and low-income family spending on education or children's clothing. 9 See, for example, Bruce and Waldman (1991) The state-year-specific postreform time trend is estimated using higher income children, while the treatment effect of welfare reform is measured in the interaction between Postreform and the lowincome indicator LI. The term is a vector of control variables.
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In an expanded, dynamic version of the model, we allow the postreform effect to vary with years since the reform, and we also estimate differential trends before the reform:
where is a vector of indicators for the j th year since state implementation j YSR st of welfare reform, with negative values of j indicating years before reform. Since all states experienced welfare reform during the sample period, the omitted YSR category is zero for the year of reform, and changes are relative to that baseline year. The coefficients of primary interest in the dynamic model comprise the vector , the differential trends in educational attainment between low-and b 3 higher income students surrounding welfare reforms.
The assumption underlying the model is that the groups experience otherwise similar changes in educational environment during the period, so the observed trend in educational attainment for higher income adolescents provides an appropriate counterfactual estimate for what would have happened to low-income adolescents in the absence of welfare reform. Conditional on covariates, 11 we assume that welfare reform is the only systematic factor that has a differential impact on the poor.
12 Although the assumption is not directly testable during the reform period, it is supported by data prior to welfare reform, as discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
The timing of welfare reform is defined for each state as the year in which the state first instituted major reforms to its cash transfer system. Data on welfare policies are from Crouse (1999) To isolate the impact of welfare reform, we control for factors that could independently influence school enrollment and dropout rates and that may be correlated with reforms. Temporary upward shifts in labor demand can increase the opportunity cost of not working and thereby increase dropout rates. 13 We use state-year macroeconomic indicators-unemployment rate and income per capita-to control for the labor market conditions. Increased school resources may increase the benefit of schooling and reduce dropout rates.
14 We therefore control directly for educational inputs using spending per pupil and the pupilteacher ratio.
We also address the potentially confounding effect of a contemporaneous change in education policy that may have affected low-income students differentially: school accountability reform. Following Hanushek and Raymond (2005), we define an accountability system as a mechanism for publicly disseminating information on standardized test performance for each school, along with a way to aggregate and interpret the school performance measure. States are classified as consequential states if they both report results and attach consequences to school performance or as report card states if they provide only a public report. Consequential accountability may provide stronger incentives to schools than report card accountability. States began introducing school accountability systems in the early 1990s, and by 2003, 31 states had consequential accountability. The timing of adoption of state accountability programs is reported in Table A1 . Table A2 illustrates two useful facts about the timing of state welfare and school accountability reforms. First, states did not generally adopt the two reforms simultaneously. Second, the states with early accountability reform are not the states with early use of welfare waivers. Without this variation, it would be impossible to empirically distinguish the effects of the two sets of reforms.
The Card and Lemieux (2000) find that the local unemployment rate is an important explanatory variable for lower school enrollment rates in the 1970s. Neumark and Wascher (1995) find that increases in the minimum wage reduced the proportion of teenagers enrolled in school and increased the proportion of teenagers who were neither enrolled in school nor employed.
14 However, the role of spending in improving educational outcomes remains controversial (Hanushek 1986 ). the analysis that follows, we control for the presence of a consequential accountability system and for the number of years that have elapsed since its adoption, and we allow these variables to have different effects on low-income children. 15 To address concerns that provisions in NCLB that relate to high school graduation rates created incentives for schools to undercount dropouts (Swanson and Chaplin 2003) , we also estimate the models in Section 4 using a shorter period that ends before NCLB.
Measures of Educational Attainment
We estimate the impact of welfare reform using measures of educational attainment from both administrative and survey sources. Our primary measures, described in Section 3.1, are administrative records of school district dropout and high school completion rates. We present the main results obtained using these measures in Section 4. As a validation exercise, in Section 5, we also present results using an external and complementary measure of attainment: selfreported school enrollment, which we obtain from October CPS files and describe in Section 3.2.
School Dropout and High School Completion Rates
We capture educational progress using school dropout and high school completion rates as our primary outcomes. We construct our measures using administrative school district panel data from the CCD survey of the U.S. Department of Education (National Center for Education Statistics 1991 Statistics -2003 . Although the survey covers all school districts in the country, data are made available only for districts that satisfy the department's minimum reporting standards. Dropout rates are available separately by grade and are averaged over grades 7-12 and 9-12 from 1991 to 2003; high school completion rates are available from 1994 to 2003. We aggregate CCD school-level data to compute the share of students in each district who are eligible for free lunches through the national school lunch program (those with a household income below 130 percent of the federal poverty level). Free-lunch eligibility (FLE) is the only student income measure in CCD; its broad definition means that the low-income group includes many children whose families are not eligible for welfare payments and would not be directly affected by the reforms. 16 This will dilute the treatment group and introduce attenuation bias in the measured impact. The advantage of using FLE as the definition is that the low-income group thus defined is likely to include children formerly and currently eligible for welfare assistance, as well as children who are potentially eligible, which allows us to avoid the issue of sample selection due to entry into or exit from welfare.
The grade G dropout rate for school year T (the school year beginning in the fall of year T) is defined as the ratio of the number of students who are enrolled in grade G in school year T but are not enrolled in any grade at the beginning of school year to the number of students enrolled in grade G in school T ϩ 1 year T. Students who graduated from high school or transferred to another school are not counted as dropouts. 17 For example, the seventh-grade dropout rate for school year 2000 is the percentage of students who were enrolled in grade 7 in school year 2000 but were not enrolled at the beginning of school year 2001 relative to the number enrolled in grade 7 in school year 2000, and the dropout rate over grades 7-12 in school year 2000 is the percentage of students who were enrolled in grades 7-12 in school year 2000 but were not enrolled in any grade at the beginning of school year 2001 relative to the number enrolled in grades 7-12 in school year 2000. The dropout rate for grades 7-12 can be interpreted as an overall measure of a district's effectiveness at keeping students enrolled. High school completers are defined as students who receive a high school diploma or a certificate of attendance or completion at the end of the summer of a school year. General Education Development certificate recipients are not counted. The high school completion rate is the number of high school completers divided by the sum of the number of high school completers, the number of grade 12 dropouts in the current year, and the number of dropouts from grades 11, 10, and 9 in the preceding 1, 2, and 3 years, respectively.
18 Table 1 reports summary statistics for the dropout and completion rates over all years and all school districts. We restrict our analytic sample to states with at least 4 years of valid observations. 19 The dropout rate increases monotonically from grade 7 to grade 12, in large part reflecting the age distribution of the different grades. The vast majority (99 percent) of school districts have dropout rates below 14 percent for grades 7-12 and below 18 percent for grades 9-12. Nevertheless, the average dropout rates in grades 9 and 10 are quite high, at 2.68 and 3.64 percent, respectively, despite the fact that most states have a legal school exit age of 16 years or older. This may be due to either high grade retention in these grades or delayed school entrance (Deming and Dynarski 2008) . The average high school completion rate is 86 percent. The majority of high school completers receive a high school diploma, and only 1.3 percent complete high school with a certificate. Also reported in Table 1 is a summary of the share of students eligible for free school lunches (ShFLE). Averaged across districts, 26 percent of students are eligible for free school lunches, and in the median school district, 22 percent of students are eligible for free lunches. In addition, in the wealthiest 10 percent of districts, less than 5 percent of students are eligible, and in the poorest 10 percent of districts, more than 50 percent of students are eligible.
Figures A1 and A2 display time trends in school dropout and high school completion rates. From 1991 to 2003, there is a general decrease in school dropout rates over all grades, and the 4-year high school completion rate also increases slightly between 1994 and 2003. In addition, states with larger shares of their student populations classified as low income have relatively more dropouts and fewer high school completers, as illustrated by Figures A3 and A4. 20 Since welfare reform directly affects only low-income students, we can estimate its impact on schooling by comparing differential trends in outcomes between FLE and non-FLE students around the time of reform. Because our data are aggregated at the school district level, we compare differential trends in outcomes across districts according to their shares of students eligible for free lunches (ShFLE it ). Figure 1 illustrates the differential trends in dropout rates for school districts with higher (above the median of 23 percent) and lower (below the median) shares of FLE students. Each curve plots the change in the enrollmentweighted average dropout rate for grades 7-12 for that group of districts relative to its value in 1996, the year that the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act was passed. Before 1996, dropout rates for the two groups of school districts track each other quite closely, whereas after 1996, there is an unmistakable divergence between the districts with low ShFLE it and high ShFLE it . Districts with higher income show relatively stable dropout rates over the period. In sharp contrast, lower income districts see an abrupt break from the pre-1996 trend; their dropout rates decrease consistently and considerably after 1996. This pattern of dramatic relative changes is confirmed in the formal regression analysis that follows.
School Enrollment
As a validity check for analysis performed at the school district level, we also estimate our model using self-reported school enrollment data for young adults from the CPS October supplement files from 1990 to 2005 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The main data set includes more than 168,000 observations of children ages 13-18 for whom schooling and household income information is available. The primary measure of low-income family status is an indicator of eligibility for subsidized (free or reduced-price) school lunches (SLE) assigned according to the condition that household income is below 185 percent of the federal poverty level. 21 We also use narrower definitions of low-income status: a household income below 130 percent of the poverty level (corresponding to the cutoff for FLE), income below the poverty level, a mother with fewer than 12 years of schooling completed, and SLE combined with the condition that the mother is unmarried. Each of the low-income groups defined above is likely to contain children who are formerly and currently eligible for welfare assistance as well as children who are potentially eligible, which therefore allows us to avoid the issue of sample selection due to entry into or exit from welfare.
In Table 2 , the basic time patterns of school enrollment rates during the sample period are shown for children ages 13-18 in low-income (SLE) and higher income 21 Total household income and the number of household members are obtained from the CPS October files (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1990 -2005 . They are compared to the federal poverty level for the given family size in that calendar year to determine income status. Income is not observed continuously in the data but is reported in ranges. Low-income status is defined conservatively, using the highest point of the income category as reported income. Results do not change if the midpoint or lower bound of the reported range is used instead. (subsidized-lunch-ineligible, or SLI) households, based on a household income that is below 185 percent of the poverty level cutoff. Considering the modest income gains of welfare recipients, the low-income (SLE) group likely contains past, current, and potential welfare-eligible children in all years, while the higher income (SLI) group likely excludes them. 22 The table also reports school enrollment rates in October of each year using CPS household weights. School enrollment rates for higher income children show fluctuations but no clear trend, while those for lower income children have a tendency to increase. The unweighted means are very similar, with differences less than .1 percent. Lowincome children are approximately 8 percent less likely to be enrolled in school, but that gap narrows from 9 to 6 percent over the 16-year sample period. The average annual percentage growth rate is .4 percent for low-income children but only .1 percent for higher income children. The regression analysis that follows explores the timing of the narrowing relative to state-level adoption of welfare reforms and confirms that the narrowing remains significant after controlling for changes in observables.
In Figure A5 , the raw trends in enrollment rates between 1995 and 2005 are illustrated for children of different ages and family income levels. Weighted average school enrollment percentages are given by age, year, and low-income status. There is substantial heterogeneity in enrollment rates by age, with near full enrollment for those ages 15 and younger. Rates of school enrollment are lower for older children, and gaps between low-income and higher income children are more pronounced. Over time, enrollment increases for SLE individuals ages 16-18 and for SLI individuals age 18.
In our analysis, we do not distinguish between high school and other school enrollment, but instead use the age cutoff of 18 to define our sample. We impose the upper age limit to ensure that our household income measure captures parental resources. Young adults enrolled in college are counted in the enrolled group. 24 (Results using alternative age cutoffs are discussed in Section 5.) Although our sample does include some college students (8 percent of SLI students and 4 percent of SLE students), we are unable to analyze the effects of welfare reform on college decisions in any detail. The results in Section 5 should be interpreted as largely applying to high school enrollment, although it should be borne in mind that gains at the secondary level may carry over to later schooling. 22 Rough estimates of year 2000 income for single mothers who are former welfare recipients are between 105 percent and 120 percent of the federal poverty level, including income from the EITC (Haskins 2001) . 24 The enrolled group includes all respondents who were enrolled in a regular school at the time of the survey. Regular school includes day and night schools, public, parochial, and other private schools and any schooling that leads to a high school diploma, college degree, or professional degree. 
Results for Administrative Dropout and High School Completion Rates

Overall Effects of Welfare Reform
Here we report estimates of the overall effects of welfare reform on the relative performance of low-income school districts, using administrative data. We begin with the modified difference-in-differences model of equation (1), where the treatment group variable is a continuous measure of the share of enrolled students who qualify for free lunches (ShFLE it ) 25 and the dependent variable is the school dropout rate for students in grades 7-12. Models are estimated using the weighted least squares method.
26
The treatment effects of welfare reform on dropout rates are captured by the coefficients on the interaction of ShFLE and Reform reported in Table 3 . Two sets of robust standard errors are reported for each estimate. The first, in parentheses, is clustered at the school district level to account for possible serial correlations in . The second, in brackets, is from a more general model that ist also allows for arbitrary error correlations across districts within the same state, by clustering at the state level. The state-level clustering produces larger standard errors in all of the columns. Hence, to be conservative in testing hypotheses, we focus on state-level clustering in the subsequent tables.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows results from the basic fixed effects model, including the full set of district and year fixed effects. Welfare reform is associated with a significant improvement in schooling outcomes for low-income students: school districts with 10 percentage points more FLE students experienced a relative reduction of .06 percentage point in the dropout rate following welfare reform (significant at the 1 percent level with district clustering and at the 5 percent level with state clustering). In column 2, the treatment effect estimate is essentially unchanged after the addition of controls for district-level school input variables (pupil/teacher ratio and spending per pupil) and changing state macroeconomic and educational characteristics (educational attainment of adults in the state, state income per capita, and state unemployment rate) (see summary statistics in Table A3 ). These results, as well as other estimates shown below that use the CCD data, are not driven by outliers; overall and for each grade level, the estimates are unchanged if we exclude the 1 percent of school districts with the highest dropout rates.
Column 3 of Table 3 supplements the model with controls for state-level 25 Results are unchanged if we use ShFLE i,tp1990 instead of the time-varying ShFLE it . 26 When the unit of observation is an aggregate measure, it is common practice to weight each observation by the number of individual elements it contains (in this case, the number of students), to improve efficiency because larger cells are subject to less sampling error. However, as Dickens (1990) shows, the method inefficiently causes overweighting of larger cells if there are important cell-specific error components. Our estimates use approximately efficient weights derived from Dickens' iterative procedure. The distribution of district sizes is quite skewed, and the efficient weights reduce the undue influence of very large districts, such as New York City, which has 1 million students. Results are the same if we use ordinary least squares estimation instead. consequential school accountability reform (if any) or state adoption of NCLB reforms (including indicators for the presence of a reform and a linear measure of months since its enactment) and interactions of the accountability variables and ShFLE. The interactions allow for differential impacts of accountability reform; in fact, we find smaller gains for lower income students following accountability reform. 27 Controlling for accountability reform leaves the main estimates for welfare reform undiminished. To address concerns that national reforms under NCLB were more comprehensive and included stronger provisions than under state accountability (in particular, with regard to dropout and completion rates), we conducted a further robustness analysis in which we estimated the model in column 3 using a shorter period, terminating our sample in 2002. These results (not reported in Table 3 ) are again similar: a .07-percentage-point relative decline in dropout rates for districts where ShFLE is 10 percentage points higher. These estimates also provide some reassurance that the estimated impact of welfare reform is not driven by systematic changes in the reporting of dropout rates (and not actual dropout rates) in the administrative data in response to NCLB incentives (Swanson and Chaplin 2003) .
The remaining columns of Table 3 report treatment effect estimates for additional robustness checks. The estimate is unchanged at Ϫ.8 in columns 4 and 5 when we add controls for state charter school policy 28 or for the generosity of the earned income tax credit (EITC) 29 and interactions with ShFLE. In column 6, we add controls for the state-level minimum wage (and interaction with ShFLE), and the point estimate increases slightly. In column 7, the estimate decreases slightly when we add controls for the teenage birth rate in the stateyear and its interaction with ShFLE.
The aforementioned analysis made use of the differential timing in start dates for state welfare reforms. However, state welfare reforms generally included a package of policy changes, and the specific policy rules varied substantially across states. In a separate analysis, we attempted to disentangle the impacts of several specific welfare reform policies that may have had strong effects on the behavior of welfare recipients and their children: time limits, sanctions for violating work requirements, earnings disregards, and school requirements for dependent children. When included in equation (1) individually and interacted with ShFLE, every policy except for the school requirement has a negative and significant 27 The estimated effect of accountability reform is a .38-percentage-point reduction in dropout rates (SE p .23; significant at the 10 percent level). The interaction term of accountability reform and ShFLE is positive (.79) and statistically insignificant. The estimates for years since reform (.041) and its interaction with ShFLE (Ϫ.055) are also statistically insignificant. 28 To be specific, we add a variable that indicates the presence of a charter school law that led to at least modest charter enrollment (2 percent of total enrollment in the 2004-5 school year) by the end of our sample period. We also add a variable for years since state charter legislation. For more information, see Sable and Hill (2006) . 29 The generosity of the EITC is measured by the combined state and federal EITC phase-in rate. 
Dynamic Effects of Welfare Reform
To explore the dynamics of the treatment effect and test for preexisting trends, we estimate the following form of equation (2):
Each observation is a school district (i) located in a state (s) for a time period (t). The dependent variable is the district's dropout or high school completion rate; and are school district and year fixed effects, respectively. The term a a i t is a vector of indicators for 5 or more years before reform, 3-4 years j YSR st before, 1-2 years before, 1-2 years after, 3-4 years after, 5-6 years after, and 7 or more years after. The treatment effect of welfare reform exposure is captured in the series of coefficients that measure differential changes in the dropout j b 3 rate relative to the baseline year of welfare reform between districts with no FLE students and districts with 100 percent FLE students. A positive sign on b 3 indicates a relatively higher dropout rate for a district with a larger FLE share, relative to the reform year.
The first column of Table 4 shows the time pattern of treatment effects for dropout rates in grades 7-12 around the time of welfare reform in a specification with no controls beyond the fixed effects. The generally insignificant ShFLE interactions with years before welfare reform imply that changes in dropout rates in the years preceding welfare reform, relative to the reform year, were substantially similar across districts with different FLE shares. In the years after welfare reform, however, the dropout rate relative to the base year is significantly lower for districts with larger shares of FLE students. This pattern strengthens the temporal link between welfare reform and educational outcomes shown in Section 4.1. In addition, the increasing magnitude of the ShFLE interaction with years after welfare reform suggests increasing gains. As more time elapses between welfare reform and outcome measurement, districts with large FLE shares experience even greater relative declines in their dropout rates.
In the second column, we add state-and district-level control variables. The results are qualitatively similar, but the magnitudes of the treatment effects are larger. For example, in 1-2 years after the implementation of welfare reform, districts with an ShFLE that is 10 percentage points higher experience a .07- .00
.00
.04
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Accountability percentage-point larger decline in dropout rates relative to the year of welfare reform. These districts experience a .15-percentage-point larger decline 5-6 years after welfare reform and a .3-percentage-point larger decline 7 or more years after welfare reform, with a standard deviation of the dropout rate that is close to .1. 30 This corresponds to a narrowing of the initial gap of 18 percent after 5 years and 36 percent after 7 years. The F-test of the hypothesis that all the prereform coefficients are zero cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels, whereas the F-test of the hypothesis that all the postreform coefficients are zero rejects the null hypothesis at 1 percent significance. The pattern is illustrated in Figure 2 , 31 where we plot the point estimates of the interactive terms and their 90 percent confidence interval bands. There is a clear break from trend around the time of welfare reform.
The dropout rate for grades 7-12 reflects the overall tendency of students in the six included grade levels to drop out of school. Table 4 also examines the dropout pattern for each of the grades separately. The effects of welfare reform 30 The coefficient on the interaction between ShFLE and the indicator for 7 or more years after reform is identified by 15 states with early welfare waiver use that have waivers for 7 or more years by the end of the sample period. Similarly, the coefficients on the interactions between LI and indicators for 9-10 years and 11 or more years after reform in Section 5 are identified by the same group of early waiver states. 31 In Figures 2 and 3 , coefficient estimates and 90 percent confidence intervals are for interactions between the district share of students with free-lunch eligibility and indicators for years before and after statewide waiver or welfare reform adoption. Models include the full set of controls, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. appear to increase between grades 7 and 9 and then decrease in size. The postreform estimates for grades 11 and 12 are statistically insignificant, except at 7 or more years after reform. Extrapolating from low-income districts to lowincome students, we infer that welfare reform reduced the relative dropout rates of low-income students in grades 7-10 but did not alter the dropout propensity of students in grades 11 and 12. This is not surprising given that the dropout rate is defined conditional on enrollment in the previous school year. Low-income students who plan to drop out before completing high school are likely to leave in earlier grades; those who reach grade 11 or grade 12 reveal themselves, by self-selection, to be more determined and academically more prepared to finish high school. 32 For the prereform period, while dropout rates for grades 7 and 8 do not vary with FLE share relative to the baseline year, the negative (although not jointly significant) estimates for grades 9 and 10 suggest that, if anything, the gap in dropout rates between low-income and high-income students may have been growing in the years before welfare reform.
Although not reported in Table 4 , the estimates for control variables link consequential school accountability systems with lower dropout rates (Ϫ.44; SE p .22), but their impact is smaller for districts with larger FLE shares (1.01; SE p .41), consistent with the interaction effect in Table 3 . In addition, in states with higher unemployment rates, dropout rates are lower, especially for grades 10-12, which suggests a possible demand-side influence. Estimates for other control variables are insignificant. Table 5 reports dynamic results for our alternative educational attainment measure: the high school completion rate. As a comparison, we repeat the results for the dropout rate for grades 7-12 from column 2 of Table 4 . The results for 4-year high school completion rates, presented in column 2, are almost a mirror image of those for aggregate dropout rates, as illustrated by Figures 2 and 3 . Prior to welfare reform, high school completion rates relative to the reform year do not vary with FLE share. Following welfare reform, completion rates relative to the base year are significantly higher for districts with larger shares of FLE students; the point estimates are jointly significant at the 1 percent level, and the individual estimates are statistically significant for observations made 3-4 years and 7 or more years after reform. The effect of welfare reform on high school completion is important because of the critical role of a high school diploma in the labor market and because completing high school gives students the option to obtain further education.
In the last two columns of Table 5 , we consider the impact of welfare reform on the educational attainment of low-income students on the basis of our alternative definition of school district income: the share of children ages 5-17 in poverty in a school district based on 1995 census data. For both dropout and high school completion rates, the basic pattern of treatment effect estimates is the same as when low income was defined by FLE. However, the magnitude of the postreform estimates is considerably higher, perhaps because the impact of welfare reform is more intense for children from welfare-prone families than for other low-income children.
In addition to estimating effects by grade level, it is interesting to measure separate effects for boys and girls, in part because the direct-incentive hypothesis would predict larger effects for girls. Unfortunately, dropout rates in grades 9-12 are available by sex only for 1998-2001, which means that there is no prereform baseline for most states. Nevertheless, preliminary analysis using the limited range of years suggests that welfare reform had similar positive effects on boys and girls, as measured by point estimates on the interactive terms. However, because girls have lower average dropout rates than boys, this translates into larger proportional effect for girls-the ratio between the estimate for the interaction between ShFLE and the indicator for 7 or more years after reform and the mean dropout rate in 1998 is .44 for boys and .62 for girls. This is consistent with low-income girls experiencing an additional direct incentive effect from welfare reform, over and above any changes in family environment.
Results for Self-Reported School Enrollment Rates
Here we examine the effects of welfare reform on school enrollment, using data from the CPS's October supplement files from 1990 to 2005 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1990 -2005 . This provides a useful comparison with other observational studies in the welfare reform literature that use survey data (for example , Offner 2005; Dave, Reichman, and Corman 2009) . It also allows us to confirm the district-level effects found in Section 4.2 using individual-level data and to test alternative definitions of the treatment and control samples. We estimate the following version of the dynamic model in equation (2) using individual-level data: indicator equal to one if an individual is in the low-income group, and j YSR st is a vector of indicators defined as in Section 4.2 but ranging from 7 or more years before reform to 11 or more years after reform. Since all states experienced welfare reform during the sample period, the omitted category is for the year of reform, and the values of for years before and after reform should be j b 2 interpreted as changes relative to the baseline reform year. The control variables in X ist include individual-level characteristics, such as race and gender, and a series of age fixed effects. They also include changing state-level macroeconomic and educational characteristics. To allow for arbitrary correlations in across ist individuals and over time within states, we cluster the standard errors at the state level for all estimation and hypothesis testing.
The treatment effect of welfare reform is captured by the vector , which b 3 measures changes in the enrollment gap by income relative to the baseline year of welfare reform. For low-income children, a positive sign on for the prer- The regression estimates of the differential time trends are reported in Table  6 . Column 1 shows results from the basic linear probability model, including child age, state and year fixed effects, and the full set of covariates. The definition of low-income status in column 1 is SLE. The point estimates for the years after reform are positive, and after 3 years they are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or lower. They imply that school enrollment increased 2 percentage points more for low-income children in the years after welfare reform. The coefficient estimates for differential pretrends alternate in sign and are not generally significant. However, the estimate for 3-4 years before reform is positive and significant, which implies a prior trend toward increasing inequality that was reversed after welfare reform. This supports the claim that the relative gains observed in the postreform period were not the result of a continuation of preexisting differential trends for the two income groups. The estimates from a probit model are very similar. Column 2 reports the effects of a discrete change from zero to one for each of the income-by-year interactions. 33 Column 3 includes a full set of interactions between the control variables (X ist ) and the lowincome indicator. Here again, the only significant prereform term is a positive estimate for the prior 3-4 years. The postreform interactions show relative gains on the order of a 2-percentage-point reduction in the enrollment gap after 7 years. This corresponds to a substantial 22 percent narrowing of the initial gap. In separate estimation, no consistent differences in treatment effects are detected for males versus females or whites versus nonwhites.
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The next columns of Table 6 demonstrate the robustness of the findings to changes in the estimation sample. During the sample period, the minimum age at which a child could legally drop out of school was at least 16 in all states. 35 Not surprising, when the sample is restricted to children ages 16 and older, as in column 4, the point estimates for postreform SLE interaction terms increase substantially in magnitude and remain statistically significant. In addition, excluding 18-year-olds from the sample leaves the results qualitatively unchanged.
Children from very high-income households may not form a relevant comparison group for very low-income children. Column 5 reports estimates from the linear probability model for children 16 and older using a narrower control group: children with family income under 300 percent of the federal poverty level. Column 6 limits the low-income group to children more likely to be affected by welfare reform: those in households headed by single women. In both cases, the estimated effects are similar to those in column 4: the postreform SLE interactions terms are all positive and are generally statistically significant, whereas the prereform SLE interaction terms are not jointly significant.
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All regressions include the full set of X ist controls and state, year, and age fixed effects. The state-and time-varying controls are generally statistically insignificant, with the notable exception of the interaction term for low income and the number of years since school accountability reform. The estimates range from Ϫ.04 to Ϫ.15, which suggests that accountability reforms disproportionately increased enrollment for higher income adolescents. The estimated effects of welfare reform are insensitive to the exclusion of the accountability reform measures and their interactions with family income. 33 Since the interpretation of marginal effects is somewhat complicated in nonlinear models with interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003) , we focus on the linear probability model. 34 Coefficients for the interactions between the low-income indicator and indicators for years since waiver are generally, but not always, larger for girls than for boys. When the treatment effect is estimated for the interaction of the low-income indicator and a postreform indicator, the impact for girls is 1.4 percent and that for boys is 1.1 percent, with each significant at the 5 percent level. The difference in treatment effects is not statistically significant. For whites, the interaction of low income and postwaiver is .7 percent, and for nonwhites it is .5 percent; neither is significant at conventional levels. 35 For state compulsory school attendance age, see National Center for Education Statistics (1995 Statistics ( -2005 . The oldest age of entry ranges from 5 to 8, and the youngest age of exit ranges from 16 to 18. 36 When we limit the sample to households headed by single mothers, the sample size is reduced to only 38,404 observations. The estimated pattern is similar to that in column 7, but the point estimates are less precise. Figures 4-7 depict the estimates from equation (4), estimated on the sample b 3 of 16-18-year-olds with alternative definitions of the low-income status indicator. 37 Bars indicate the 90 percent confidence intervals. Coefficient estimates and confidence intervals are for the interactions of the low-income indicator and the indicators for years before and after statewide waiver or welfare reform adoption. Regression models include the full set of controls, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. The sample includes children ages 16-18 in 1990-2005 . Figure 4 shows the estimates in column 4 of Table 6 . A similar time pattern emerges in Figure 5 when the low-income group is limited to those with FLE (income below 130 percent of the poverty level): the postreform effects are larger-more than 5 percentage points after a decade-and, again, significantly different from zero. Using the poverty level as the income cutoff level substantially reduces the low-income sample size and leads to noisier estimates of the treatment effect in Figure 6 . Defining the disadvantaged sample as children whose mothers have fewer than 12 years of formal schooling also decreases the sample size, in part as a result of observations missing maternal education information. The estimates in Figures 6 and 7 confirm the break from trend around the time of welfare reform and the average cumulative effects of approximately 5 percent. . Differential trends in school enrollment, by when mother is a high school dropout of gains for adolescents as well. Several differences between this paper and the experimental studies may explain the difference in results. First, the experimental studies consider shorter time horizons (2-5 years after reform). In our data, the gains from welfare reform are not immediate but increase gradually over time. Second, the experimental studies used different (often subjective) measures of schooling outcomes. Third, the experimental samples were limited to adolescents whose mothers were enrolled in welfare programs, thus neglecting the effects of reduced welfare dependence both by mothers of adolescents and by adolescents themselves. The importance of these entry effects is confirmed in observational studies that focus on teenage girls and find evidence of direct effects of welfare reform in lowering fertility and welfare participation rates (Offner 2005) .
Conclusions
Beyond providing a new evaluation of welfare reform, this study also yields additional insight into the role of home environment and government programs outside of formal education on the educational attainment of individuals in lowincome households. These findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of school dropout and completion rates. These outcomes have received increasing policy attention in recent years, including provisions in NCLB, and their measurement and determinants have become a subject of controversy (see Heckman and LaFontaine [2010] and references therein). An important limitation of the current study is that our reduced-form estimation does not allow us to disentangle the distinct potential channels for the overall effects. Nevertheless, our finding of educational gains for both males and females, which increase with years of exposure, supports an important role for the indirect channel through home environment. Understanding the relative importance of family environment and direct employment incentives is an important area for future research. 
